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1939 - HMS Veteran
I commissioned the vintage destroyer Veteran from reserve
at Chatham and a veteran she surely was, built shortly after World War
1. We applied at once to the Company of Veteran Motorists for honorary
membership. The Company responded graciously by making the ship a Life
Member. When, long after I left her, a Uboat’s torpedo sent the old girl
to the bottom of the Atlantic, she was probably still wearing on the forward
screen of her bridge, that King-size Veteran Driver's badge, bearing the
motto: Care and Courtesy.
While the storm gathered, my raw crew and their raw
skipper were going through that harsh, vicious changeover from peace to
war; adapting ourselves, as so many of our ancestors had done, to the
current technique of defending our vital merchant navy which, except for
the advent of air power, was back to where the last war had ended. There
were, of course, new Boffins producing new ideas. The magic of radar,
for example, was entering our lives, complete with teething troubles.
Seamen who had never seen the sea were trained to operate it. The buzz
got round that crossing the beam with the instrument switched on, would
make them impotent. Came rough weather, less superstitious operators,
frequently, put paid to their precious instruments by being sick into
them. Emergency signals went forth telling Medical Research to drop the
pill they were working on to keep Wrens out of trouble, and get cracking
on one to stop radar operators being seasick. And so on. A different war
with different problems, but the same old tussle with human imperfections.
But the conditions, demands and humbling effect of the sea are forever
and ever. Nothing changes them.
When Veteran had completed her hurried trials, we joined
Western Approaches in which I was to remain for the next four years. Western
Approaches was just another label for our Atlantic seaboard. It was clear
from the start that naval history was about to repeat itself with the
same old challenge to our merchant shipping. In fact, Winston Churchill
was about to say that the Atlantic was the only battlefield on which we
could lose the war. It was, once again, to the west we looked for survival
remembering that, already, once this century, we had nearly looked in
vain.
In the hundred years of peace which preceded World War
I, the most deadly weapon ever launched against our assembled merchant
shipping passed from fiction to the drawing board and into service. All
navies showed interest in the submarine but, none least of all ours (the
greatest of them all) thought seriously about combating it. And so the
Uboat caught us cold. Arthur Marder leaves me with a picture of gloom
at the Admiralty in the spring of 1917, with our First Sea Lord mooning
about muttering of shipping losses beyond hope or remedy. In the quarter
ending 30th June, in 352 encounters with Uboats, only eleven unconvincing
sinkings of them were reported. Although the defensive offensive merits
of the convoy had been, automatically, adapted to protect our merchantmen
from all comers through the previous six centuries, it wouldn't work against
Uboats. When the situation became critical, it took some bright, forceful
brains from beneath, and the Prime Minister himself from above, to bring
the Navy to its senses by convincing it that convoying was the soundest
employment for escort ships and that for the Uboats, escorted ships in
convoy were more difficult to attack. At that stage, a Planning Section
of the Operations Division was formed at the Admiralty, under the direction
of the late captain of HMS Colossus, Dudley Pound. Marder endows Pound,
generously, with the qualities of an efficient human computer, but does
not consider him an ideal choice for this job because he was "too
much a master of detail" and a "supreme centraliser who did
not know how to employ assistants". Nevertheless, there he was at
the Navy's hub, to see for himself how the introduction of ocean convoys
checked our appalling shipping losses and began to turn the tide. Yet,
this same man, a quarter of a century later as First Sea Lord, was to
snatch away from an Arctic convoy, the very protection he advocated in
1917 and, thereby, send twenty one merchant ships out of thirty four to
the bottom of the Barents Sea.
When Veteran arrived at Plymouth, her new base, the
Navy had about the same tonnage of merchant shipping to protect as at
the outset of World War 1 and
the same dearth of escorts to do the job. But this time we had an antisubmarine
weapon the Asdic. How about starting convoy? In spite of our exorbitantly
expensive lesson from World War I, would there be controversy and delay
again? According to the current ethics of war at sea, we were fortunate.
A matter of hours after declaration of war, a young Uboat skipper sank
the Athenia, with American passengers on board, thereby showing the enemy's
unrestricted intentions. As Winston Churchill puts it, "Our weakness
in escort vessels had, however, forced the Admiralty to devise a policy
of evasive routing on the oceans unless and until the enemy had adopted
unrestricted Uboat warfare ... but the sinking of the Athenia upset these
plans and we adopted convoy in the North Atlantic forthwith". Rather
than upset these plans, I would have preferred "mercifully blasted
these plans sky high". Equally, I don't know exactly when the North
Atlantic first bore an escorted British convoy, but it was far too long
after the sinking of the Athenia.
For Veteran, throughout that memorably ferocious first
winter which we spent burrowing into Western Approaches and the English
Channel, the sea was teaching us in its cruel way to be a crew or else
... From the war effort side, it was time wasted. We all had jitters.
Ashore, instead of CinC Western Approaches' staff snatching the convoy
hat off the hook, dusting it down and donning it, they dithered. Churchill,
while reminding us that there have never been enough escorts at any time
in any war, says the Admiralty was forced to devise a policy of evasive
routing. History had already shown what evasive routing had cost us in
World War I and was about to confirm its extravagance compared to convoy.
As shored Control dithered, it also jittered by sending us crashing about,
not only to dead "kills" and stale scents, but also to periscopes
sighted by anyone between aircrews and old ladies on piers. And, sure
enough, we fell for it.
When the weather allowed us to use our Asdics, submerged
Uboat contacts reverberated everywhere continuously; the surface bristled
with hallucinatory periscopes, imagined by me and everyone else who looked
for them long enough. But rather than carp about this jittering period,
let us remind ourselves that it was all part of the clanging "gear
change" from peace to war, with every single one of us wearing a
large "L" on his back, wondering, apprehensively, how we would
fare when it came to "The Test".
As the jitter period ended, convoys started. First Channel
and coastal convoys were formed, then the ocean framework took shape under
the direction of Admiral Dunbar Naismith VC, then CinC, Western Approaches. As the war progressed,
Western Approaches became, and was to remain, the convoy hub, not only
controlling ocean convoys at home and abroad delegating local control
where necessary but devising, teaching and amending convoy procedure.
Later, as the framework extended to include troop and Arctic convoys,
although their operational control might come under other CommandersinChief,
or even the Admiralty, they still wore the Western Approaches Club tie,
so to speak.
The Merchant Navy
How about the Merchant Navy? As already inferred, the
peacetime relationship between our Merchant and Royal Navies was poor.
For years we had turned up our snobbish noses and maintained that the
Merchant Navy was something to be seen and not heard. Apart from their
officers and seamen doing periodical training in warships, and many of
us travelling to and from foreign stations in their liners, there was
lamentably little mixing. It was entirely our fault that they thought
that we thought we were some superior form of sea life. If it could be
said that any war does anyone any good, World War II soon tore down that
ridiculous barrier between our two navies. The very first time I attended
a convoy conference at Plymouth with skippers and first officers of all
ships sailing present, I well remember the rather self-conscious, but
unmistakable warmth of brotherhood forcing its way to the surface. We
were qualified professional fighters, but what a rude shock for them to
suddenly find their comfortable, defenceless ships built to ferry people
and merchandise across the seven seas, becoming coveted targets for extermination.
Here were uninhibited skippers, devoid of herding instinct who had spent
their lives travelling happier and safer alone, listening to this cold
unattractive logic, sensing the discomfort of convoy, little realising
that basically because they were seamen, they would soon be handling their
ships and keeping their station as well as any of us. But from the expressions
on the faces around me that day, it was clear that each skipper was going
to find it very difficult to convince himself that moving about the ocean
in solid chunks of merchant shipping, as if on some gigantic parade ground,
was actually safer.
During the first winter, dense fog descended on an early
convoy, which Veteran was escorting up Channel. Here was a brand new,
pre-radar experience for all of us. Convoy instructions supplied to all
present, implored merchant ships in convoy, in fog, to maintain their
course and speed. Out on the convoy's flank, we soon knew of one ship
who didn't. We first sighted or was it heard?
one another a few seconds before we collided in a discord of juddering
sparks. It was a glancing blow, and damage was miraculously slight. It
was remarkable, too, that no other collisions occurred, for when the fog
lifted, there was certainly no convoy and, luckily, no Uboats. Walking
back from the fo'c'sle after examining our twisted stern, I noted our
Veteran Driver's badge facing me from the bridge screen. I hadn't had
much chance to be careful, but I vowed to be more courteous in future.
It was the only collision I ever had at sea. I hope the skipper of that
merchant ship can say the same. All of us who sailed into that early Channel
fog, escorts and freighters, were learners.
By the time PQ17 sailed, we were experts. By the end
of the war there could not have been more than a handful of surviving
merchant skippers who hadn't had at least one swim. What a lot we all
had to learn the hard and only way.
Every trip provided something new in convoy technique. For the escorted
there was, I repeat, this disturbing feeling of having ships all round
them all day and, worse still, all the blacked out night. It was one thing
for experienced merchant skippers in a nice warm lecture room to know
that, in convoy, if you held your course and speed you had nothing to
worry about. On a dark night or in fog, imagination soon produced plenty.
For the escorts, also starting from scratch, many among their crews had
never even seen the sea. Everything, from the ship to the seasick bucket
was new. By age and seniority, I found myself more often than not, SO
Escort, which meant "father" to whatever miscellany of escorts
could be snatched together for a waiting convoy. In the early days, if
I knew any of the other captains sailing with me I was lucky. True, we
were all on the same side, in the same war, using the same rule books,
but what limp shadows we were then of the Escort Groups to come.
Then there was the domestic sheepdog angle to learn,
forming the freighters up, often with other ships joining at sea. Next,
the essential practising of large turns as soon as the complete convoy
was formed. After that, the long haul with a scratched up escort battling
weather to keep alert and in station, around its flock. As so often, the
important part was the monotonous part. More often that not, from departure
to destination, to the persistent background "pinging" of our
Asdics and at the speed of our slowest ship, we just waddled and yawned
along. Occasionally, there was sudden tension, an accelerating escort,
a mighty upheaval from a pattern of depth charges, for we could never
afford to take chances. All the same, it is perhaps just as well we didn't
have to pay for those depth charges expended on false echoes. As Johnny
Walker, the greatest escort commander of us all, once put it more subtly
to his own group by signal, on realising the contact they had been pounding
was a shoal of fish and not a shoal of Uboats after all: I AM AFRAID WE
MUST LEAVE AND PUT IT DOWN TO A MYTHYOLOGICAL GEFUFFLE .
The Battle Fleets, naturally, took all the modern destroyers,
leaving us the oldies, to which we added any craft which could stand up
to Atlantic weather, from trawlers to luxurious yachts. On an early trip,
I had with me HMS Philante, probably the most luxurious yacht of them
all, which had been hastily fitted out for war. Her skipper told me that
when he joined and found himself occupying the No 1 Stateroom, he noted
a row of unlabelled mother-of-pearl press buttons alongside his bunk.
He pressed one, there was a low humming sound and his First Lieutenant
arrived in bed beside him, via some hidden chute.
Considering all our crews, officers and men, were raw
material, mostly Reservists from all walks of life, some of whom had never
even seen the sea, it was amazing how soon and how well they mucked in
together and made a go and a team of it. Air, health and food were good,
so was sleep and, best of all, leave when they could get it. Not so good
were the cold and the wet clothes that never dried. The Atlantic may be
all right to cross in dry warmth, but it could be a bastard to loll about
in, shooing a 7knot convoy for ten days. Worst of all was the anxiety
which dogged those crews, believing their nearest and dearest safe, until
they suddenly heard that bombing of their home towns put everyone in the
front line together.
We got very tired too. I remember once returning from
sea to be told for the third time to be ready to sail again on completion
of fuelling. I am lazy by nature, but this time I realised quite clearly
that ”I would not be ready. Wondering if I would soon be facing a firing
squad, I staggered off to Headquarters to tell the Admiral that to keep
Veteran going would cost him a night in harbour for one destroyer. Without
a harsh word we got it. I started my sleep in his car on my way back to
the ship. On another occasion, when Veteran paused for an hour or two
in Dover Harbour, I crawled to my bunk. When I woke I was told HM the
King had been on board. With a yawn I asked if he had the Pope with him.
But it was true. Then why the hell didn't the First Lieutenant wake me?
He was asleep too.
When you get down to self-pity, war is like hospital;
you soon find that the suffering round you is far worse than your own.
An apposite moment to quote a memorable signal from my World War II collection.
During tense operations in the Mediterranean off Crete, when our cruisers
and destroyers which escaped being sunk, were battered and worn, the remains
of a destroyer flotilla limped into Alexandria. No sooner had they fuelled
than, like Veteran, they were ordered back to sea but unlike Veteran,
to the Luftwaffe's dive-bombers. The Rear Admiral commanding the destroyers
signalled Admiral Cunningham, the CommanderinChief, Mediterranean, pointing
out that these wretched ships were scarcely seaworthy; one was leaking
badly, another had one engine out of action, a third's steering gear was
US. The CinC's reply, surely the toughest and hardest to send: THIS IS
NO TIME FOR DESTROYERS TO BE BREAKING DOWN.
With the crescendo of conflict, the focus of Western
Approaches ocean convoy control shifted north from Plymouth to Liverpool,
and Veteran shifted with it. We arrived there. Paradoxically enough, to
forget about escorting ocean convoys for a while. A glance at the map
is enough to show the value of Holland, Denmark and Norway to Germany
having elected to conquer the world. When Hitler annexed the first two,
he didn't sit about coveting the third; in a classic, ruthless sweep he
acquired it overnight on the 9th of April 1940. Norway is, virtually,
a thousand mile platform between sea and mountain with a single linking
coastal road. The invaders grabbed key roadside points, simultaneously,
from Oslo to Narvik. The peace loving Norwegians had no hope.
The best Veteran could offer was bustled, uncoordinated
counterattack which started with a bang, then wilted all the way up the
coast and slunk back home two months later. Our opening bang was a very
effective submarine assault, and a brilliant destroyer attack by destroyers
of the Home Fleet. A key point in northern Norway was Narvik; seaport,
northernmost harbour and railhead of Germany's vital iron ore supply.
Five destroyers, led by Captain WarburtonLee, in Hardy, were detached
from the fleet, and ordered to attack Narvik. I don't remember exactly
where Veteran was at the time, but we must have been at sea, for I do
remember reading the signals. In the early stages of her approach, Hardy
intercepted some Norwegian patrol vessels who gave Captain WarburtonLee
his first reliable information about Narvik which he then signalled back
to the Admiralty;
NORWEGIANS REPORT GERMANS HOLDING NARVIK IN FORCE. SIX
DESTROYERS AND ONE SUBMARINE. CHANNEL POSSIBLY MINED. INTEND ATTACKING
AT DAWN HIGH WATER. Admiralty replied, questioning the authenticity of
Norwegian reports:
NORWEGIAN COAST DEFENCE SHIPS EIDSVOLD AND NORGE MAY
BE IN GERMAN HANDS. YOU ALONE CAN JUDGE WHETHER IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES
ATTACK SHOULD BE MADE. WE SHALL SUPPORT WHATEVER DECISION YOU TAKE.
The whole Navy waited tensely for Hardy's reply. When
it came it gave the morale of all who read it, a wonderful boost:
AM
GOING IN.
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